American Ally: Tony Blair and the War on Terror

This account of Blair's role in Bush's wars contains some useful information, but it is overly sympathetic - Coughlin is executive editor of the Sunday Telegraph - relying on inside sources and interviews with Bush and Blair.

Coughlin reminds us how the government's expensive secret services have let us down. In January 2001, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service said, "The actual threat [from Al Qa'ida] does not match the media hype." And, "Their resources and targets tend to be abroad rather than in Britain."

Blair showed his vast conceit when he said to Bush the day after the war started, "I kind of think that the decisions taken in the next few weeks will determine the rest of the world for years to come. As primary players, we have a chance to shape the issues that are discussed. Both of us will have enormous capital, and a lot of people will be with us."

But Britain's role was dupe, not ally. A senior British intelligence officer said, "We were completely and utterly stuffed by the Americans. We should never trust them again, or until we see a change of attitude from the Bush administration. Forget what they say, it's what they do. They simply didn't take any notice of any advice we gave them. They just did what suited them." So all Blair's warm words about Palestine are just chaff. Coughlin gullibly writes, "Blair succeeded in getting Bush to make a public commitment to establish a Palestinian state before the end of his second term."

On weapons of mass destruction, Blair said as late as September 2003, "I have absolutely no doubt that evidence will be found and I have absolutely no doubt [again!] that it exists."

An Al Qa'ida leader said, "prolonging the war is in our interest." Blair wants the same - he said, "I have absolutely no doubt [again!] as to what we should do. We should stick with it. There is absolutely no doubt [and again!] in my mind that what is happening in Iraq is crucial for our own security. Never mind the security of Iraq or the greater Middle East. It is crucial for the security of the world. If they are defeated - this type of global terrorism and insurgency in Iraq - we will defeat them everywhere." He was making the coloniser's confusion of insurgency with terrorism. But the Iraqi insurgents have already won, and Iraq, the Middle East, Britain and the world will be safer when the troops have left Iraq.

Blair's lies and folly are class requirements, not personal failings - the British ruling class wanted war with Iraq, and he was their front man, doing whatever led to war. But enough of this ruling class deception and self-deception. What matters is that the working class acts to end the occupation.

Another Dodgy Dossier (1/36 people found this helpful)

As future historians begin to ask how it was that the Britain inherited by New Labour; internally secure, economically strong and confident abroad, but yearning for reform at home; turned into the Britain Blair leaves behind - disaffected, facing defeat abroad, with growing inflation and internally insecure, with creeping erosion of civil liberties - they could do worse than turn to this book. Unfortunately, as an account of the Blair premiership it's neither particularly engrossing nor entertaining. Described as `vivid' on the jacket, it reveals little that isn't already in print. Since it relies for its insights largely, as Coughlin himself admits, on high-placed sources insisting on anonymity, we are forced to accept them on a `trust me I have inside information that I can't reveal to you' - basis. Hmm....haven't we been here before?

There are minor errors in points of detail which don't inspire confidence. For instance,Durham is not and never was a coal-mining city: and, ploughing on, it becomes clear that the book is full of apparent statements of fact which actually are assertions: how does he know for instance, that Colin Powell's abortive visit to Israel/Palestine in 2002 failed because `Ariel Sharon had influential allies in the White House who made it their business to ensure that Powell's mission was a failure?' Was that really why it failed?

The book is disappointingly short of authentic personal witness and observation: something one might have expected from what purports to be a definitive account of a personal relationship between two powerful individuals. For instance, it's interesting to compare Coughlin's account of the 2002 dinner at the presidential ranch at Crawford Texas at which, according to Coughlin, Blair `wore a black suit out of respect for the recent death of the Queen Mother' with Sir Christopher Meyer's vivid and much more entertaining personal witness - much rubbished by Downing Street - that on arrival at the dinner Blair had to dash away and quickly change since mistakenly he'd arrived wearing jeans. One wonders why Coughlin mentions the suit at all.

Nevertheless, 'American Ally' may offer some clues about the causes of Britain's decay under Blair, offering as it does an exclusively Blair-centric account of his relationship, first with Clinton, then with Bush. Beginning with the moment when he declares `Century upon century it has been the destiny of Britain to lead other nations. We are a leader of nations or we are nothing', this neo-con Utopian masquerading as a socialist ('...With my class background I could and- lets be blunt about this - would have joined another party....')came to Downing Street possessed as none of his predecessors - save one - of the power of his own belief. The well known high mutual regard between Blair and Margaret Thatcher is once again rehearsed here. The memory of Thatcher's success in the Falklands made a big impression on Blair, reinforcing his will when, early in New Labour's term the Kosovo crisis catapulted him to a platform from which he was able eventually to orchestrate the defeat of Milosevich, dragging the US under Clinton along with him only at the cost of public and Parliamentary opposition leaving him personally at times dangerously exposed. But Milosevich fell and if today Kosovo remains unstable, the adventure brought peace of a kind leaving Blair with a sense of the correctness of his own judgment powerfully re-inforced. Kosovo and the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement were Blair's finest hour.

From the moment of Clinton's defeat, Blair made it his mission to forge an equally strong relationship with George Bush. The first so-called `Colgate summit ` is once again recounted, although readers may enjoy comparing Coughlin's account with that of Sir Christopher Meyer in 'DC Confidential'. From their first meeting, it is clear that Blair's well-known talent for appearing to agree with each person he meets - whatever their opinion - played a large part in persuading George Bush that here was someone he could work with. For his part, Blair seems to have been progressively deluded into believing that the things he had to say were in fact carrying weight with the President and his team. In fact, not even his much-promoted insistence on the problem of Israel/Palestine seems to have had much effect on the course of events there. Its interesting to read that Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw Israeli troops from Gaza and pull out of certain settlements was actually negotiated by Elliot Abrams- a leading neo-conservative brought into the White House to work on the `road map'- in Blair's complete ignorance. `We were not negotiating with the British government, we were negotiating with the Israelis' said Abrams; while in the Rose Garden Bush continued to insist on Blair as `America's staunchest friend.'

As chaos and killing in Iraq grew and spread following the fall of Baghdad, Blair's dismay at the trap into which his personal determination had lead the UK and its military forces grew. The Abu Ghraib scandal, says Coughlin, compounded Blair's deep sense of betrayal at the way the Bush administration handled Iraq. A `Downing Street aide' is quoted; `....we all came to the view that we would never embark on another venture like this with the Bush administration.' So that's all right, then.

With so much instant history already available on the tragic partnership of Bush and Blair its hard to recommend this one, comprehensive though it is. Readers seeking a more balanced and insightful account would do better to turn to `The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency - James Naughtie's recent masterly account of these crucial years. Those with a taste for something more anecdotal and racy will enjoy DC Confidential, the account by Sir Christopher Meyer of his years as British Ambassador in Washington.

With its portrait of a firm-jawed leader of principle standing shoulder to shoulder with his principal ally, and then, in spite of personal suffering, bravely resisting public and Parliamentary disapproval as he struggles to `complete the job', 'American Ally' reads like a dossier to accompany the job application which Blair is presumably already making to the lucrative American lecture and foundation circuit against his coming exit from Downing Street. And for Con Coughlin? To paraphrase a well-authenticated proposal from Blair himself to the British satirist Rory Bremner: "How does Sir Con Coughlin sound?" Or even, (assuming he can afford it), Lord Con of Spin?

fab (16/19 people found this helpful)

The West's leading left of centre writer and thinker mr coughlin has taken the war mongers of downing street and the white house to task for failing to forsee what he always knew. inequality and insecurity has enraged the arab world. mr coughlin does not pull punches. as always he writes with verve and humour backed by an intellect unrivalled in all but the top colleges of further education, of which i count oxford, yale, cambridge, the sorbonne and, don't laugh, durham (my alma mater) With Iraq in turmoil, the threat from the tottering Saudis increases. Despite recent terrorist attacks in London, the ongoing alliance between Britain and the US has never been more critical, as mr coughlin rightly observes. but to whose benefit? . Using his famous intelligence sources, and unique access to top aides and other newspapers, in both the Bush and Blair camps, this fine author has written the definitive book on this crucial relationship between Britain and the US and the personalities involved. The defining aspect of Tony Blair's leadership is his courting of a 'special relationship' with Gordon Brown and not the US. Talk about this making him first Clinton's, and then Bush's closest ally in Europe, Coughlin dismisses as mere hot air, wrongly in my view. He shows the early friendship and empathy between Blair and Cherie and the beginning of their relationship. He mentions en passant the war on terror, although only coughlin anticipated 9/11 and its aftermath. Whereas the closeness between Blair and Clinton came as no surprise, since both were young and fit men. Blair's instant rapport with George W. Bush was initially harder to understand snce neither are 'mummy's boys.' Coughlin argues, however, that far from being Bush's poodle,or lap dog, Blair was driven by his own strong moral convictions in his pursuit of the War on Oil. Coughlin's fabulous and well-researched and insightful book sheds little new light on the inner workings of a political alliance that has proved the most decisive catalyst in international war and peace, from the war against Afghanistan to the full invasion of Iraq, and the disastrous aftermath. For all that I recommend it.

American Ally: Tony Blair and the War on Terror

Con Coughlin

Reader Reviews:

Overly sympathetic account of warmongers (1/38 people found this helpful)

Another Dodgy Dossier (1/36 people found this helpful)

fab (16/19 people found this helpful)

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