Confrontation, the War with Indonesia 1962-1966

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Nick Van Der Bijl

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Pages: 240 (Hardcover)

ISBN: 1844155951

Pub: Pen & Sword Military

Pub date: 2007-09-20

Amazon.co.uk Sales Rank: 70312

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Reader Reviews:


4/5 stars

Clear, hold and dominate (1/1 people found this helpful)


I was living in Singapore when this war broke out. I knew people who went to Borneo as it then was. My father didn't go but he must have been involved in the work required to get the Royal Air force there.

It is always like the Malayan emergency as an example of British ingenuity as they beat the enemy in guerrilla warfare. The British also claim that if the US has taken on the same tactics they might have won the Vietnam war. Easy to say, impossible to prove.

I don't think it is a subject that has been much written about and is still fairly unknown amongst the general public. Perhaps it was because the army was a completely volunteer army by that point that the public were less aware of it. National service had finished only about that time.

The British boast that they avoided a Vietnam style war and defeat because they used minimum force. It might have been because Britain hadn't got the resources to indulge in mass helicopter attacks or carpet bombing. The British had 80 helicopters in Borneo whereas the US had 3,100 in Vietnam .
By keeping the fighting to the jungle and only amongst the army and the insurgents there were very few civilian casualties. Unlike most guerrilla war the army took as proactive approach.As they say the best form of defence is going on the offensive. As a result the enemy were not allowed to feel safe just because they were inside their own borders.

From interrogations it emerged that the enemy had ill prepared the incursions and sometimes they crossed the borders without maps and compasses and were intending to live off the land with the help of locals The British decided that although the Indonesian army was agressive planning was weak.

The British took the risk that world opinion would turn against them if it became well known that they were crossing borders to take the war to a country that were not officially at war with.

The Indonesians did not want people want it known what was gong on so did not reveal the fact that they were being attacked in their own country. The British decided not to escalate the war to a degree that they would bomb the bases that the insurgents were coming from.

The war therefore remained under reported and as a result the army was left to its own devices. The Vietnam war and later conflicts would suffer form excessive reporting. The author is scathing of journalists who reckon they are experts on strategy and tactics.

Nowadays the armchair generals are given excessive amounts of air time to give their views on any and every aspect of what our armed forces are up to.

It was decided that rather than wait for the insurgents to cross the border that they would be monitored and attacked before they were able to complete their task. It was a war of intelligence and the use of minimum force.

The British were superior in mobility flexibility, aggression and skill supported by a co-ordinated and effective intelligence. The British went in for hearts and minds by giving aid to the local population.


This was is often quoted as a British success and a model for later wars such as the current Iraq situation. The problem is they are difficult to compare.

Borneo was in the jungle against a country that did not have the resources of the Iraqi insurgents or have the backing of China or Russia as in the Vietcong. The British were lucky that they had acquired jungle experience in Malaya and had won that campaign. They used minimum force because they had to as they did not have the resources. It worked and is worthy of study but the model my not work elsewhere.

The British boasted that they US were using the wrong tactics in Iraq after the invasion but the British do not seem to have fared very well and have effectively withdrawn from the fighting as it was beyond them.

A great book and worthy of a read.

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Categories

Amazon.co.uk places this book into the following categories:

Books -> Subjects -> History -> Countries & Regions -> Asia -> South East Asia -> Indonesia
Books -> Subjects -> History -> Countries & Regions -> Asia -> 1946-Present
Books -> Subjects -> History -> Britain & Ireland
Books -> Subjects -> History -> Other Historical Subjects
Books -> Subjects -> History -> Military History -> Wars, Battles & Campaigns
Books -> Subjects -> History -> General
Books -> Refinements -> Language (feature_browse-bin) -> English
Books -> Refinements -> Age (feature_two_browse-bin)
Books -> Refinements -> Format (binding_browse-bin) -> Hardcover
Books -> Refinements -> Condition (condition-type)

 

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