Consciousness and Berkeley's Metaphysics (PSI Informatics)

There is only one thing worse than this pretentious book; and that is the fact that the author deemed it necessary to indite it in the first place. I was disappointed with the obscurity of Mr Lloyd's writing and disheartened that anybody could write for so long on subjects as vague and unproven as Berkeley's theories on Metaphysics.

Not only does "Consciousness and Berkeley's Metaphysics" rate as one of the most self indulgent pieces of literary tripe I have ever read, I feel that Mr Lloyd could have done something more productive with his time, such as baked a cake or taken up a sporting activity.

Although I did not enjoy this book, I do feel that it would have a better use in some other capacity; perhaps as a doorstop or support for a wobbling table. Quite like any other similar philosophy book that has been or will be published at anytime.

A stimulating contribution to the current debate (2/2 people found this helpful)

These books are not for the faint-hearted - they are technical, closely argued and erudite - but will interest those wrestling with problems raised by the philosophy of consciousness and who are looking for the kind of solution that makes consciousness primary rather than secondary. They are built on the idealism of the 18th century Irish Bishop George Berkeley, a man who has been wilfully misunderstood by generations of critics.

In the first book Peter sets out the history and context of the mind-body problem, and provides an admirable summary of various theories of mind, all of which he finds wanting. He then goes on to consider theories of reality before advancing his own view of mental monism and its implications, ending up with a statement of the Berkeleian model of the mind. The second book builds on the first. It provides an account of Berkeley's metaphysics, a very good summary of the whole range of psi phenomena and theoretical approaches to explanation. He then proposes a Berkeleian model of psi and considers Jung's approach to UFOs.

Peter's suggestion is that the conscious mind has its own ontological standing, 'and is neither identified with, nor supervenient on, the brain, or its activities, or its functions'. He proposes that the neural correlates of consciousness are non-deterministic events in the brain and that conscious experiences and acts of volition can occur in the non-physical mind independently of what happens in the brain. Perceptions are induced by what Peter calls the 'metamind' (he eschews Berkeley's use of God here). He argues that sensory ideas can only exist in the mind, and that objects likewise can only exist in the mind. This does not take account of the middle reflexive position developed by Max Velmans, even though it is logically consistent. Peter reverses the argument of Wittgenstein and Ryle that statements about the mental world are derivative by insisting that 'statements about the mind make genuine reference to the mind'. His Berkeleian view uses the term 'experientia' to denote the contents of consciousness and the term 'metaverse' to mean the mental universe or union of all minds at all levels of existence (not just physical). In this sense an 'ordinary mind' is a subset of the metamind, 'closed under ordinary operations of mental access'.

This theory can now be applied to paranormal phenomena beyond what Peter calls the 'ontological myopia' of conventional neuroscience. Each mind is a vortex in the same common pool, although we are warned against conceiving this in a spatial way. This view means that psi phenomena are 'fundamentally the same kind of process as those that take place within minds' -- each mind being a set of exeperientia and the metaverse being the union of all minds. Peter does not claim to provide a complete theory, and certainly shows up the shortcomings of existing approaches. I think that his view is along the right lines since the data do point towards consciousness being fundamental rather than derivative in the scheme of things. Peter's books are a stimulating contribution to the current debate.

[From the review published in Network, the journal of the Scientific and Medical Network, no. 72, April 2000, reproduced with permission.]

An original and thought provoking metaphysical analysis. (2/2 people found this helpful)

Peter Lloyd's book makes the case for a Berkelian monism, a metaphysical view which most modern readers may approach, I gather, with suspicion. The author makes his case very astoutly and, to my mind, successfully. The picture of reality that emerges from Lloyd's presentation is truly fascinating. All told, the text is a beautiful analytical composition in the context of which the author is dealing with many cnetral issues in the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. Indeed, even if the reader is doubtful about the metaphysical stance being argued for, the text is extremely valuable for the conceptual analyses it offers of key concepts and issues in philosophical psychology. These analyses are both systematic and thorough and many of the arguments presented are original and, to my mind, ingenious. Especially to be noted is the discussion regarding the location of the mind and that of the relationship between mind and brain.. Whether the reader shares the author's metaphysical worldview or not, the text is bound to make him/her think and reflect. For both its intellectual and asesthetic value "Conciousness and Berkeley's Metaphysics" is highly recommended.

Prof. Benny Shanon Department of Psychology The Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel

Consciousness and Berkeley's Metaphysics (PSI Informatics)

Peter B. Lloyd

Reader Reviews:

Appauling (1/6 people found this helpful)

A stimulating contribution to the current debate (2/2 people found this helpful)

An original and thought provoking metaphysical analysis. (2/2 people found this helpful)

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