The Selfish Gene

click here for more details, find new or used items	Richard Dawkins Our price £9.74 (£14.99) New from £8.20 Used from £6.97 Pages: 384 (Hardcover) ISBN: 0199291144 Pub: OUP Oxford Pub date: 2006-03-16 Amazon.co.uk Sales Rank: 12970

Reader Reviews:

Imaginative guessing (0/3 people found this helpful)

I have attempted to read Dawkins's books on a few occasions but seldom get beyond the first 100 pages. I simply find his style of writing boring and his theories pure imaginative guesswork; I cannot take this author's ideas onboard yet biology fascinates me and especially that of epigenetics which seems to disprove all that this author advocates. I suspect that there is a snobbery value to those who support him. Irrespective of his academic standing I cannot avoid regarding the author as an imposter as I constantly want to wage war with his views. Admittedly, he comes across publicly as a very plausible academic but, that does not sway me.

Blind theorizing (6/22 people found this helpful)

Dawkins writes that "the argument of this book is that we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes" (p.xxi) and that "We are survival machines - robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes" (p.xxi). Yet, according to him, this book "is not science fiction; it is science" (p.xxi)!

Dawkins contrives to overlook the twin discoveries that:
1. the observable traits of organisms are mostly conditioned by the interactions of many genes;
2. most genes have multiple effects on many of these traits.

Dawkins transfers characteristics with which he is familiar from human behaviour on the macro-level to the inanimate components, "genes", of which we are physically constructed. He then proceeds to argue that these impersonal entities, which he imagines to possess characteristically human traits, infallibly generate the same unpleasant traits in human behaviour on the macro-level. So he writes: "The gene is the basic unit of selfishness" (p.36).

The absurdity is evident in that genes or other nonconscious entities cannot be either selfish or unselfish. They cannot "compete" against anything or "choose" anything.

If Dawkins were right, what would be the point of declaring, as he does: "Let us try to *teach* generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish" (p.3)? For if we really were machines, as he believes, even these very concepts would be meaningless to us. And certainly his oratory could have no effect whatever on our actual behaviour.

In fact genes do not force us to behave in any particular way. Neither can they possess the ability to direct or to comprehend all that is required to adopt a course of either heartless selfishness or heartfelt, sacrificial compassion.

The arguments in this review have been challenged by the claim that Dawkins himself answers these charges. His claim is, in effect, that that "the evolution of behavioural reactions or patterns via natural selection" and "control by nonconscious mechanisms" are two vastly different ideas. Also it is said that Dawkins does not deny a freedom of choice as the very last lines in this book itself "celebrate the human ability to make choices that transcend genetic control and instinctive reactions." So it is said that Dawkins "repeatedly draws clear distinctions" to prevent his readers from jumping to the conclusions expressed above.

However, there is a vast difference between asserting that such distinctions exist and actually laying a solid theoretical foundation for such distinctions. To lay the kinds of foundations which Dawkins does and then to go on to insist that these foundations do not lead to their logical conclusion is nothing less than an act of faith on Dawkins' part. It certainly does not bestow any validity upon Dawkins alleged distinctions. The bottom line is that Dawkins' presuppositions simply do not lead logically to the sort of distinction which he asserts.

Essentially this debate is an argument not about data, but about underlying assumptions. Here is a example of what I mean:

ASSUMPTION: 1. "evolution is true";
DATUM: 2. "human beings have consciousness";
ASSUMPTION: 3. "therefore evolution is capable of generating consciousness".

Once again, it is a case of "garbage in, garbage out" (as Dawkins himself would say).

Scientifically sound but philosophically flawed (3/7 people found this helpful)

Darwin's theory of evolution is no doubt a successful scientific hypothesis, and Prof. Dawkins brings across this very clearly. However, I do have some doubts regarding his philosophical assertions.

Essentially Prof. Dawkins believes that:

1) Selfishness and competition is at the root of all biological phenomena - nature as "red in tooth and claw"
2) There is no basic "dis-continuity" between humanity and other animals - humans are not qualitatively different from other animals
3) There is however no ethical dilemma between this basic fact and the human desire for goodness - since descriptive and normative realities are intrinsically separate (what is and what should be are independent of each other)

Yet the basis for point 3) - the inherent seperation of "what is" and "what ought to be" is just a philosophical assertion. Prof. Dawkins is very correct in stating that the belief in God and all other religious assertions should be treated and critically analysed as scientific hypotheses. However, strictly speaking this should go beyond the subject of religion to include every other field of human intellectual activity, including of course philosophy itself. If we treat the assertion "'what is' is fundamentally separate from 'what ought to be'" as a strict scientific hypothesis in the same sense that "God exists" is treated as such a hypothesis, then it has to be said that it is no more than just a blank assertion without any kind of empirical justification.

In other words, Prof. Dawkins is mistaken in assuming that his particular view of evolution and Darwinism does not leave us with an ethical dilemma, because it evidently does. The only argument Prof. Dawkins has offered against this is the mere assertion that "what ought to be" must be seperate from "what is", yet this assertion, just like religious assertions regarding God, cannot be scientifically or empirically proven.

Still great after all these years (0/1 people found this helpful)

Despite being over 30 years old, this book is still a powerful and exciting account of how life, including humans, came to be. The examples and explanations (aphid & ant coexistence, fluke worms in snails) are breathtaking in their descriptions of the natural world, and could easily awaken an interest in zoology in the casual reader.

Love your genes! (4/6 people found this helpful)

I read this book about 10 years ago and it nearly ruined my life. It led me to reject virtually any fundamental goodness within myself (as given to me by my genes), purely because I considered it a `lie'. This wasn't Dawkins fault - his book is a good one - it was my own short sightedness. Don't fall into the same trap as I did.

When most of us self-observe, we look into a conditioned mind. We can't see beyond the myriad self-images that we've created of ourselves i.e. our ego(s). The original brain that you were born with was probably closer to `altruism' than you will ever see again. Our genes aren't stupid. They didn't get this far by actively seeking friction with other creatures; Dawkins' "memes" have caused the friction. As I remember, Dawkins uses memes at the end of the book as a rather weak "hey don't worry it's not all bad" type statement. Unfortunately, memes have thus far caused, more `selfishness' than the genes themselves.

I have an `unsuccessful' pay review with my boss. I get tense, stressed, angry and resent my boss. I come away feeling retched. Looking inside myself, it seems all this demanding must have been due to my selfish genes and their desire to preserve their existence. But taking the time to look a little deeper (which isn't easy), what I actually see is that my fundamental mind - as given to me by my genes - wants none of the situation. What it really wants is for me to not care a jot about money - it hates what I put it through for things it doesn't need.

Because it's so hard to see beyond our conditioning, much of the selfishness we see in ourselves is not a reflection of our genotype but of the dog-eat-dog world to which it has been subjected (aka. our phenotype). Human phenotypes nowadays have a level of `selfishness' many degrees beyond their pre-conditioned states. If you try to see beyond your conditioned self into what actually lies beneath, what you'll almost certainly find is that what your genotype craves more than anything is peace. And its needs for this are basic: food, water, love, sex, acceptable climate and I also suspect, in humans, the opportunity to express itself through creativity.

My point here is really that if, like me you're going to get all introspective, try to separate out what your genotype mind needs vs. what your phenotype (egoic mind) desires. It's tricky, but isn't it logical that our genes are more likely to be right about what our body requires for a happy life than the crazy world that we now live in? Once we start placing the needs of our genes first, the body and mind reach a previously unimaginable level of health, and can take on any challenge thrown up by this often blinded world.

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